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JUL 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT : GNCART Suppliers Meeting 27 June 63  
Preliminary Highlights**

1. Subject meeting was attended by representatives of Lockheed, Pratt & Whitney, and  Headquarters was represented by General Carter, Col. Gillar, Col. Ledford, and appropriate representatives of OEA and USAF.

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2. A closed session limited to Lockheed and Headquarters was called for the purpose of correcting certain misunderstandings associated with the aircraft 123 accident and with the accident board report and its findings.  a board member, and  base commander, recounted an authentic history of the flight as reconstructed by the board centering around the pitot total pressure probe malfunction, the resulting false instrument readings, and pilot reactions.

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Four Lockheed actions resulting from board recommendations briefly are:

- a) Incorporation of new pitot system with increased de-icing capability.
- b) Add "pitot heat off" warning light.
- c) Add flight recorder with separate pitot system. This system to provide redundancy for main system.
- d) Add fourth inverter for emergency stability system operation.

The feasibility of an angle of attack indicator for the cockpit will be investigated.

IFR restrictions were lifted.

3. In opening the general meeting, General Carter expressed the maximum urgency associated with every part of the program.

4. Mr. Johnson cited the major Lockheed flight test problems. The most significant of these involved envelope speed-altitude extension as limited by the airflow mis-match. A definitely better definition of the problem exists than did two months ago. This definition involves

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inlet spike and bypass door scheduling, and stability, inlet pressure distortion, ejector secondary airflow and trailing edge flap oscillations as bearing on aircraft roughness.

5. The operational readiness target date forecast was discussed with opinions ranging from October 1963 to January 1964.

6. Pratt & Whitney discussed development progress and flight test problems. Again, a better definition of the airflow mis-match exists in the area of rotor speed suppression felt to be associated with inlet distortion resulting in false input signals to the engine main fuel control and resulting in a degradation of engine cycle efficiency. It was also evident that improper engine turbine temperature trimming is contributing to slow accelerations experienced on recent flights. Actions are underway to further define distortion, and improve turbine temperature trim.

The most important recently surfaced engine problem at this time is excessive oil consumption. The degree at present is not limiting test flight duration but will certainly limit longer test flights and be completely incompatible with mission requirements unless corrected. A maximum effort has been launched to define and correct the problem.

The engine 223 oil contamination incident has been pin pointed to a design deficiency, involving an upper tower shaft cupwasher interference with the shaft bearing cage. This interference restricted cage rotation resulting in bearing failure. Immediate steps were taken to inspect all engines. (As of 28 June prior to further flight, 7 engines had been inspected and found OK).

7. General Carter closed the meeting with a re-emphasis of the maximum urgency involved.

8. A limited session with top management of all contractors and headquarters was called to discuss extraordinary actions for accelerating the flight test program. The following took place:

- 25X1A a) Implementation of earlier Monday shuttle from Burbank to
- b) Earlier daily scheduling of all flights to reduce limitation of consistent afternoon weather degradation.
- 25X1A c) Pressure was applied to Mr. Johnson to substantially increase his personal responsibilities and time in directing flight test operations at

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- d) Mr. Johnson resisted suggestions involving increasing his personnel or changing shift schedules, to increase productive output in order for faster aircraft turnaround.

25X1A Actions subsequent to this meeting involve Mr. Parangosky's extended visit to [ ] and a recommendation to Pratt & Whitney that one of their most senior engineers visit [ ] for an extended visit. This is felt necessary in view of Mr. Johnson's apparent plans. 25X1A

SIGNED

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[ ]  
Development Division  
(Special Activities)

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[ ] DD/OSA:mvp (1 July 63)

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